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Abstract
In this study, I have focussed on the importance of Wittgenstein in the thought of Eliz-
abeth Anscombe. Although Anscombe detached herself from her master’s approach, her 
encounter with him was extremely important in her own work. In particular, I will take 
into consideration common points and discrepancies between the two philosophers. I will 
also recall Anscombe’s An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (first published in 1959) 
on its anniversary.
Keywords: Anscombe; Wittgenstein; reason; cause; intention; action; mentalism; behav-
iourism
Resum. Anscombe i Wittgenstein 
En aquest estudi m’he centrat en la importància de Wittgenstein en el pensament d’Eli-
zabeth Anscombe. Tot i que Anscombe es va separar de l’enfocament del seu mestre, la 
seva trobada amb ell va ser de gran importància per al seu propi treball. En particular, 
prendré en consideració punts comuns i discrepàncies entre ambdós filòsofs. També em 
referiré a An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus”, llibre publicat per primera vegada 
el 1959 i el seixantè aniversari del qual es va celebrar l’any passat.
Paraules clau: Anscombe; Wittgenstein; raó; causa; intenció; acció; mentalisme; conduc-
tisme
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‘No philosopher’s work has assimilated Wittgenstein’s insights in a more inti-
mate and profound way than that of Anscombe’,1 says Anselm Müller, a pupil 
of Elizabeth Anscombe. However, while the philosophical closeness between 
Wittgenstein and Anscombe is indisputable, it should be noted that Anscombe 
distanced herself from her master’s philosophy by developing her own. Müller 
goes on:
[…] Anscombe was Wittgenstein’s pupil, not his disciple or follower: his teach-
ing was her inspiration, not a belief to be accepted by the authority of her 
mentor, before his understanding and examination. On the contrary, given 
the kind of charisma and irresistible influence Wittgenstein evidently had on 
his students, and given the fact that what he had to say was after all original 
in an astonishing and remarkably well-articulated and argued way, Anscombe 
is to be admired for the independence of her thinking.2 
In this brief study,3 I will first show the relationship between Wittgenstein 
and Anscombe, highlighting how much the encounter with her teacher left a 
mark upon Anscombe’s own work. Then I will discuss common points and 
discrepancies between the two philosophers.
1. Introduction
Anscombe devoted much attention to Wittgenstein’s work throughout her 
research. While surpassing and detaching herself considerably from her mas-
ter’s thought, there are nevertheless essays and commentaries right up to the 
last years of his work. The only ‘systematic’ work about Wittgenstein is An 
Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.4 However, the second phase of Witt-
genstein’s thought is decisive in Anscombe’s own work.
Anscombe’s philosophy, as Roger Teichmann recalls,5 particularly in the 
more strictly moral sphere, is based mainly on three philosophers: Aristotle, 
Wittgenstein and Hume. Aristotle for the direction of thought, Wittgenstein 
for the philosophical method and Hume for his ability to raise important 
questions not easily discerned with the naked eye.
It is widely noted6 that in his writings following Tractatus and after the 
1930s, Wittgenstein’s thinking changed. Consider only The Blue Book, The 
Brown Book, Philosophische Bemerkungen, Philosophische Grammatik and Phi-
losophische Untersuchungen, etc.
1. Grimi (2014: 437).
2. Ibidem.
3. For this study I refer to ch. 2 ‘L’insegnamento di Wittgenstein’, and ch. 4 ‘Intenzione’, in 
Grimi (2014). Some parts of the text are taken from there and then reworked.
4. Anscombe (1965). For a detailed analysis of Anscombe’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus please read ch. 2 ‘L’insegnamento di Wittgenstein’, cit., where I analyze the enti-
re work in detail.
5. Teichmann (2008: 53).
6. Literature on this subject is constantly growing; the chapter Transizione by Marconi is 
interesting (1977: 59-101).
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If many philosophers followed this two-phase approach to understanding 
Wittgenstein’s thought, Anscombe, though certainly aware of the progress in 
his thought, chose to make a different interpretation of Tractatus that showed 
Wittgenstein’s subsequent work as a continuous of the past. The shift from 
Tractatus to Untersuchungen, according to Anscombe’s proposed interpretation, 
was not a passage from the ideal logic to ordinary language but a shift in the 
conception of the logic of language. Marconi notes in this regard: 
Even the image of Wittgenstein that emerges from the literature specifically 
dedicated to his thought has changed several times, and profoundly, from 
the Thirties to today… Usually 1959 (An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Trac-
tatus by Elizabeth Anscombe) is the beginning of a different reading of the 
book from ‘22, in which it is less closely associated with neo-positivism and 
instead is related to the work of Frege and Russell, to which it explicitly refers. 
Anscombe, benefiting from a long personal custom with Wittgenstein and 
his explanations of Tractatus, could speak of the book as an episode in his 
philosophical path, without referring it to other theoretical experiences and 
emphasizing the influences explicitly recognised by Wittgenstein: in addition 
to Frege and Russell, and Schopenhauer as well.7
Wittgenstein’s works following Tractatus are decisive in understanding the 
maturation of Anscombe’s thought. In particular, there are two invaluable 
reflections in the famous masterpiece Intention that I shall briefly present here: 
the criticism of mentalism (and therefore the relative rejection of behaviour-
ism), and the distinction between causes and reasons.
2. Criticism of mentalism and rejection of behaviourism
Wittgenstein observes that the confusion that reigns in empirical psychology 
is because concepts are uprooted from language. What is needed is a grammar 
of psychological terms, as we read at the end of The Blue Book: 
[…] one may say that what we were concerned with in these investigations 
was the grammar of those words which describe what we are calling ‘mental 
activities’: seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. And this amounts to the same as saying 
that we are concerned with the grammar of ‘phrases describing sense data’.8 
In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein claimed that ‘the use of the word in prac-
tice is its meaning.’9 Here, he introduces the notion that the concept for which 
a word acquires its meaning is closely connected with its use. So, in analysing 
the grammar of an expression such as ‘This description is derived from my 
sensory data’, one might wonder if there is continuity between the way sever-
al individuals use the expression and its meaning. Wittgenstein proposes the 
following example, a question that one could easily ask oneself on a critical 
7. Marconi (1977: 6).
8. Wittgenstein (1958: 69).
9. Ibid.
168  Enrahonar 64, 2020 Elisa Grimi
level when faced with the phenomenon of colour blindness: ‘I never know 
what the other person really means by “brown”, or what he really sees by 
“brown”, or what he really sees when he (truthfully) says he sees a brown 
object’. One of Wittgenstein’s hypotheses would be to use two different words 
instead of the single word ‘brown’: one word for ‘his particular expression’ and 
another with the meaning that others, not only the subject in question, could 
also understand. However, Wittgenstein immediately observes that this solu-
tion is fallacious: there is, in fact, something wrong in the subject’s conception 
of the meaning of the word ‘brown’. Read this passage:
Saying: ‘I derive a description of visual reality’ cannot mean something anal-
ogous to ‘I derive a description from what I see here’. I can, for example, see 
a table in which a coloured square is related to the word ‘brown’, and also a 
spot of the same colour elsewhere; and I could say: ‘This table shows me that 
I must use the word “brown” to describe this stain.’ This is how I can derive 
the word I need in my description. But it would be meaningless to say that 
I derive the word ‘brown’ from the particular chromatic impression I had.10
To Wittgenstein, therefore, the meaning of an expression depends on its 
use: mind, action and language seem to be predisposed to act in unison. 
Therefore, there is no need to resort to private language, to internal process-
es. Wittgenstein therefore criticises mentalism; Saul Kripke’s text, Wittgen-
stein on Rules and Private Language, is significant in this regard. Kripke 
retraces Wittgenstein’s paradox from the Philosophische Untersuchungen, 
pointing out the problem left open, namely how to prove that psychological 
terms do not refer to mental entities. Wittgenstein wrote in Philosophische 
Untersuchungen (§201): ‘This was our paradox: no course of action could 
be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to 
accord with the rule’.11 Kripke dedicates the second chapter of the afore-
mentioned text, ‘The Wittgensteinian Paradox’, to this problem of Wittgen-
stein’s sceptical paradox and formulates an arithmetic example. Suffice it to 
recall this passage here: 
It simply is in the nature of a sense to determine a referent. But ultimately 
the sceptical problem cannot be evaded, and it arises precisely in the question 
of how the existence of any mental entity or idea in my mind can constitute 
‘grasping’ one particular sense rather than another. The idea in my mind is a 
finite object: can it not be interpreted as determining a quus function, rather 
than a plus function? Of course, there may be another idea in my mind which 
is supposed to constitute its act of assigning a particular interpretation to the 
first idea; but then the problem obviously arises again at this new level. (A 
rule for interpreting a rule again.) And so on. For Wittgenstein, Platonism 
is largely an unhelpful evasion of the problem of how finite minds can give 
rules that are supposed to apply to an infinity of cases. Platonic objects may 
10. Ivi, 74.
11. Wittgenstein (1953: §201, 81).
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be self-interpreting, or rather, they may need no interpretation; but ultimately 
there must be some mental entity involved that raises the sceptical problem.12 
Kripke is not in full agreement with Wittgenstein; in fact, he comments: 
‘[…] my own linguistics do not entirely agree with Wittgenstein’s remark’, and 
continues, ‘coming to understand, or learning, seems to me to be a “mental 
process” if anything is’.13 Wittgenstein’s direct students, such as Anscombe14 
and von Wright, revisited the impasse that Kripke highlights in this passage; 
that is, they revisited that investigation of the mind left open by Wittgenstein. 
Significant in this regard is Intention, in which Anscombe conducts a detailed 
analysis of intentional action and related problems.
It is also good to remember that Wittgenstein’s philosophy also contains a 
criticism of behaviourism; that is, to Wittgenstein, it is not possible to access 
mental states by reducing them to behaviour. Wittgenstein writes: ‘to see “this” 
does not mean: to have this reaction, because it is possible for me to see with-
out having any reaction’.15 As Eddy Carli also observes, with Wittgenstein it 
is correct to ask not whether thought, understanding or intention are mental 
processes, but under what circumstances you say ‘I think’, ‘I know’, ‘I mean’, 
etc. Here, not only is the relevance that Wittgenstein gives to the context 
evident, but we also begin to glimpse the basis of that first-person ethics that 
will later characterise the authors who will revisit the theme of virtues, includ-
ing Anscombe (cfr. The First Person). Anscombe will also take up the antimen-
talism that characterises Wittgensteinian argumentation, as well as making the 
need for an ‘adequate philosophy of psychology’ one of her theses in Modern 
Moral Philosophy
3. The distinction between causes and reasons
3.1. It is useful to highlight the close correlation between intention and action. 
In fact, in contemporary action theory, many theories have been put forward 
that can be traced mainly to two types of orientation: 1. the anti-causalist 
position, or 2. the causalist position, which then leads to naturalism. In both 
perspectives, intention is recognised as an important element of human action.
Eddy Carli16 identifies the two major conceptual cores present in contem-
porary philosophy with an analytical orientation. The first current refers to 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophische Untersuchungen and considers action connected 
to intentionality and subjectivity. In this perspective, to get an explanation of 
action, it is necessary to go back to logical and interpretative models unlike 
those used by the sciences: the reasons for action are not comparable to the 
12. Kripke (1982: 54).
13. Ivi, 49-50.
14. Mary Geach notes that Anscombe did not accept Wittgenstein’s interpretation of Kripke; 
see Anscombe (2011: XVII).
15. Wittgenstein (1980: §83).
16. Carli (2003: 33 and following).
170  Enrahonar 64, 2020 Elisa Grimi
causes that determine the movement of the natural world. We find some of 
Wittgenstein’s students in this camp, among them Anscombe and von Wright. 
Compared to Wittgenstein’s work, however, there is an additional element in 
their analyses, namely a systematic analysis of the mental state of intention 
and of those elements that consider action intentional, which is why it differs 
from simple body movements. Anscombe dealt with action based on a prac-
tical interest, without pursuing an interest in speculative knowledge or an 
ethical and normative investigation. It was precisely Anscombe who promot-
ed the revival of the Aristotelian practical syllogism as a model of explanation 
of human action. In spite of the other syllogisms that have a causal foundation, 
practical syllogism captures the teleological element of the action, the direction 
towards an end deliberately chosen by the agent. The logic of action promot-
ed by von Wright also takes this perspective, in that it is capable of directing 
human beings’ intentional action by taking the normative aspects related 
to human action into account. According to von Wright, the teleological 
explanation of action must be ‘logically conclusive:17 1. the agent intends to 
obtain p; 2. the agent realises that s/he cannot obtain p except by doing the 
action a; so 3. the agent is willing to do a.
Anscombe and von Wright are also staunch proponents of that ‘Wittgen-
steinian antimentalism’ according to which the intention or the will behind 
the external manifestations of action is not taken into account metaphorical-
ly, because in doing so they would be considered the causes of behaviour or 
action. The teleological explanation in such a perspective would thus dismiss 
a causal explanation and action equated with any natural phenomenon. 
Therefore, according to an anti-causalist position, it is possible to provide 
different descriptions of the same action, and they are precisely what charac-
terise an action as intentional or not. To Anscombe, and to von Wright, an 
action is intentional under a particular description that characterises it. 
Therefore, from Anscombe’s point of view, an action cannot be explained by 
the nomological-inferential model of scientific laws, since in doing so it is 
impossible to grasp its teleological aspect. With regard to Anscombe’s pro-
posal, Carli writes: 
The logical character of practical reasoning, which characterises man’s action, 
can only be grasped by Aristotle’s practical syllogism. And it is for this reason 
that the method of practical inference becomes a true and proper explicative 
paradigm of human action and occupies a crucial position in the explanation 
of intentional action.18
There is also a second perspective that supports the possibility of providing 
a causal explanation of action, similar to an explanation of natural phenome-
na. The causes of an action here match the reasons, a distinction that will be 
very important to Anscombian action. We find W. V. O. Quine, D. Davidson 
17. Von Wright (1971: §§ 8-10).
18. Carli (2003: 35).
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and J. Hornsby in favour of a ruthless rationalisation of action. Davidson in 
particular has made or promoted a sort of naturalisation of intentional action.
A common note in these different orientations is the reference to inten-
tional action, which is always postulated at the beginning of the argument, 
albeit on different grounds.
3.2. The main characteristic of Anscombe’s philosophy is revisiting the dis-
tinction between causes and reasons19 of the action placed in a teleological 
horizon. The relationship between causes and reasons in significant action is 
discussed in the numerous paragraphs in Intention (§§10-19) that Anscombe 
dedicates to wondering if reasons are also causes of actions or if they are dif-
ferent from causes, supporting an anti-causalistic position with respect to the 
explanation of intentional action and revisiting the teleological aspect inherent 
in intention. This perspective was strongly criticised by Donald Davidson in 
a 1963 essay entitled ‘Action, Reason and Causes’.20
In §16, Anscombe proposes summary definitions of the core elements of 
the usual theory of action. In particular:
— Intentional actions: a sub-class of events in a person’s history which are 
known to that person not just because s/he observes them. 
— Mental causality: characterised by being known without observation and 
excluded from the above category.
— The question ‘Why?’: it applies to intentional actions. The question ‘Why?’ 
is not an ‘intentional criterion’ if the answer is evidence to expresses a 
cause, including mental cause.
— Answer to the question ‘Why?’ (the question is given the correct meaning 
and the question ‘Why?’ applies; there is an intentional criterion when one 
of the following three conditions applies):
a) simply mention past history the answer is already characterised as a reason for 
acting, i.e., as an answer to the question ‘Why?’ in the 
requisite sense
b) give an interpretation of the action the answer is already characterised as a reason for 
acting, i.e., as an answer to the question ‘Why?’ in the 
requisite sense
c) mention something future it is an answer to that question if the ideas of good or 
harm are involved in its meaning as an answer, or if 
further enquiry elicits that it is connected with ‘interpre-
tative’ motive, or intention with which
From this summary, the role played by intentional action is central. Ans-
combe says: ‘We do not mention any extra feature attaching to an action at 
the time it is done by calling it intentional. Proof of this is supposing there is 
19. See Carli (2002).
20. Davidson (1980).
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such a feature’.21 Anscombe then wonders: what makes an intentional action? 
Calling an action intentional means assigning it to the class of intentional 
actions. However, it is necessary to give a description under which an action 
is intentional in order to be able to assert the intentional nature of the action; 
the same action may be intentional under one description but not under 
another. Candace Vogler, commenting on this paragraph22, highlights the 
Anscombian question of whether a description can show what should accom-
pany or be added to an action in order to make it an intentional action, i.e., 
whether such a description can provide the basis for distinguishing between 
actions and mere behaviour. Anscombe says no. Vogler continues by observing 
a critical point in the narrative which she leaves partially open: on the one 
hand is the mind, on the other is the action. What we want to know is the 
relationship between them, or rather how the mind forms action. Vogler 
writes: ‘In order to give shape to the action, the mind must choose those 
descriptions according to which the action will be intentional’.23 Also inter-
esting in this respect is P. Geach’s comments on this passage: 
It seems absurd that an intention should steal upon one unawares, like a 
fit of anger or fear. On the other hand, how can there be a voluntary act of 
intending? […] People have sometimes identified as acts of intending what 
are perfectly genuine acts of the mind, namely acts of ‘saying in one’s heart’ 
something like, ‘What I am about (to do) is so-and-so’. But such performances 
will not fulfil the role of intention. For one thing, in ever so many cases of 
intentional action, nothing like this is ‘said in the heart’ at the time. Theories 
of acts of intention cover up such awkward cases by such phrases as ‘virtual 
intention’ or ‘habitual intention’. […] Again, as regards what I say in my 
heart, just as much as what I say aloud, the question may be raised whether 
I really meant it. […] But something as to which we can again ask what was 
meant and how it was meant cannot fulfil the role of determining the way an 
outward act is meant.24
Anscombe continues her argument by stating that intentional action must 
be considered in its unity, for intention is not something that sticks to an act 
ad hoc; she writes: 
And in describing intentional actions as such, it will be a mistake to look for 
the fundamental description of what occurs such as the movements of muscles 
or molecules – and then think of intention as something, perhaps very compli-
cated, which qualifies this. The only events to consider are intentional actions 
themselves, and to call an action intentional is to say it is intentional under 
some description that we give (or could give) of it.25
21. Anscombe (2000: §19).
22. Vogler, (2010: 203-215).
23. Ivi, 207.
24. Geach (2000: 73-74).
25. Anscombe (2000: § 19).
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It is interesting here to recall Eddy Carli’s exposition of the anticausalistic 
thesis of Anscombe’s intentional action on the following three topics: 1. the 
topic of the question ‘Why?’, 2. the topic of logical connection, 3. the ‘gener-
al’ topic of intention. Anscombe criticizes the thesis that intentional actions 
are actions (or movements) caused by mental states and events, the occurrence 
of which explains the occurrence of the action.
The first argument that we summarise here refers to the question ‘Why?’, 
as Anscombe understands it, i.e., as a question followed by an answer that 
provides the reason for acting. There are cases in which this question cannot 
be applied, and therefore what we have is a simple indication of the cause of 
the action and not the reason for the action; think of the case of involuntary 
actions. One can also give the case in which the question ‘Why?’ is answered 
by giving the mental cause of the action and not the reason, for example if one 
is suddenly frightened by a scary face and the jolt causes the glass in one’s hand 
to break after dropping to the ground. Obviously, the glass does not fall and 
break due to an intentional action. In this case, Anscombe denies that the 
mental causes can be linked to the intentional action. She does not deny, 
however, and it is good to take note here, that there are mental causes of par-
ticular events, or that such events can cause actions.
The second argument in support of the anticausalist thesis is ‘logical con-
nection’. Carli always reminds us that a causal relationship can be discovered 
only inductively, and never through a conceptual analysis; therefore, since the 
relationship between reason and action is logical-conceptual, there is no caus-
al connection between reasons and actions. In short: ‘Since there is a logical 
relationship between the intention I of an agent X to do A and his/her doing 
A, A cannot be an effect of I’.26 Carli gives the following example: let’s suppose 
that a person is running towards a departing train with the intention of getting 
on that 9:00 a.m. train bound for Venice, and with the belief that that is a 
train. The action is recognised as an intentional action of which an intention-
al description is given of the reasons it was carried out. In conclusion, there-
fore, it can be said that ‘between the propositional content of the intentional 
states explaining the action and the description by which that action is 
described there is therefore a conceptual and not causal connection’.27
The third and final argument is a general argument against any causalistic 
version of the mind and intentional action. It criticises causalism and mental-
ism; it denies that ‘intentional action can depend on introspection, that is to 
say on any distinct or psychological action that exists prior to intentional 
action and that it is therefore the cause of it’.28 Carli observes that Anscombe’s 
criticism of introspection is greatly influenced by Wittgenstein’s investigations 
elaborated in the Philosophische Untersuchungen.
26. Carli (2003: 98).
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
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In conclusion, it is good to recall Davidson’s position29 that causes and rea-
sons are identical in support of a causal analysis of intentional action and there-
fore in opposition to Anscombe’s perspective.30
4. Conclusion
As Mary Geach observes in the introduction to one of the last posthumous 
collections of Anscombe’s essays, if we compare the two philosophies of Witt-
genstein, Anscombe was more linked to the second one. It was precisely his 
love for truth that led Wittgenstein, notes Geach, to recognise that the theories 
contained in Tractatus did not adequately describe language. Anscombe found 
a great deal in this famous writing, so much that she wrote a book about it, 
agreeing, for example, with the criticism that there is such a thing as causal 
connection.31 However, such a study must not obscure her main focal point, 
which, as Geach observes, came to converge in the works in the second part 
of his thought, although she then distanced herself from it. In this sense, in 
order to understand the Anscombian oeuvre as a whole, it is necessary to have 
Wittgenstein’s thought in mind, in addition to the debate around the author 
then in vogue in England, which was influenced by the major philosophical 
trends (think of the developments since the Vienna Circle, for example), as 
well as the situation that was raging in Europe.
Therefore, while the professional, affective and historical context in which 
Anscombe worked cannot be overlooked, the originality factor that character-
ises her work should also be noted, as she was as attentive to the real as the 
innovative in her research; as attentive to training students as lively yet critical 
debate in the dialogue between colleagues.
The way Wittgenstein’s work and Anscombe’s thought are related is so 
complex that it would require an entire study. Here, we wanted to present only 
the main points of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, which are necessary to under-
stand Anscombe’s thought, thus giving more space to the work that she ded-
icated to it, which changed the interpretation with which we discuss and read 
Tractatus.
Below is a list of the essays that Anscombe dedicated to Wittgenstein. 
Obviously, her relationship with this brilliant thinker cannot be reduced to 
a collection of articles, let alone a summary; in this sense, I trust that the list 
below can serve as a good springboard for further research aimed at new 
developments.
29. See J. Hornsby (2011: 105-127), which compares Anscombe and Davidson’s two different 
positions with respect to the cause-reason relationship.
30. For a detailed analysis, please see Davidson (1980); E. Carli (2003, ch. VI).
31. Cfr. Ivi, XVI. As Geach points out, the theme of causality was one of the main issues dear 
to the author. See also notes Anscombe’s interest in Hume and his essay from the same 
collection, ‘Hume on Causality: Introductory’, in Anscombe (2011: 95-123).
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1952
— ‘Wittgenstein’ [Letter to the Editor], in World Review, London, New Series 
35 (Jan. 1952), p. 3.
1953
— ‘Note on the English Version of Wittgenstein’s Philosophische Untersuch-
ungen’, in Mind, vol. 62 (1953), pp. 521-522.
— Translation: L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1953.
1954
— ‘Misinformation: What Wittgenstein Really Said’, in The Tablet, 17 Apr. 
1954, p. 373.
— ‘The Tractatus of Wittgenstein’ [Letter to the Editor], in The Tablet, 15 
May 1954, pp. 478-479.
1956
— Translation: L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1956.
1959
— An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Hutchinson, London, 1959; 
[Spanish translation: Introducción al Tractatus de Wittgenstein, transl. M. 
Pérez, El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 1977; [Italian transl.: Introduzione al Trac-
tatus di Wittgenstein, transl. E. Mistretta, Ubaldini, Rome, 1966]
— ‘Mr. Copi on Objects, Properties and Relations in the Tractatus’, in Mind, 
vol. 68 (1959), p. 404; [Copi, I. – Beard, R.W. (eds.), Essays on Wittgen-
stein’s Tractatus, Thoemmes, Bristol, 1966, pp. 187-188. 
— ‘Wittgenstein the Elusive’ [Letter to the Editor], in Times Literary Supple-
ment, 29 May 1959, p. 321.
1961
— Translation: L. Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916, Blackwell, Oxford, 
1961.
1962
— ‘Wittgenstein in Red’ [Letter to the Editor], in Times Literary Supplement, 
25 May 1962, p. 373.
— ‘Wittgenstein in Red’ [Letter to the Editor], in Times Literary Supplement, 
8 June 1962, p. 429.
1965
— [With G.H. von Wright and R. Rhees] ‘Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’ [Letter 
to the Editor], in Times Literary Supplement, 18 Feb. 1965, p. 132.
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1967
— Translation: L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, Blackwell, Oxford, 1967.
1969
— [With Denis Paul] Translation: L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1969.
— ‘On the Form of Wittgenstein’s Writing’, in R. Klibansky (ed.), Contem-
porary Philosophy: A Survey, vol. 3, La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1969, pp. 
373-378; From Plato to Wittgenstein. Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe, pp. 187-
192.
— Bibliography of Works by G.E.M. Anscombe [= J.V. (ed.) Canfield, The 
Philosophy of Wittgenstein, vol. V, Garland Publishing Co., London – New 
York 1986, pp. 1-6] [=F.A. Flowers (ed.), Portraits of Wittgenstein, vol. IV, 
Thoemmes Press, Bristol – Sterling, 1999, pp. 177-181].
1970
— [With G.H. von Wright and R. Rhees] ‘Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’ [Letter 
to the Editor], in Times Literary Supplement, 9 Oct. 1970, p. 1165.
1973
— ‘Wittgenstein’ [Letter to the Editor], in Times Literary Supplement, 16 Nov. 
1973, p. 1401.
1974
— ‘Wittgenstein’ [Letter to the Editor], in Times Literary Supplement, 4 Jan. 
1974, p. 12.
— ’Wittgenstein’ [Letter to the Editor], in Times Literary Supplement, 18 Jan. 
1974, p. 55.
1977
— ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’, in Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 
28, n. 1-3 (1976), pp. 188-215. [= J. Hintikka (ed.), Essays on Wittgenstein 
in Honour of G.H. von Wright].
1978
— ‘Interview about Wittgenstein’, in Dutch [6], in F. Boenders (ed.), Over 
Wittgenstein gesproken, Het Wereldvenster, Baarn, 1978.
1981
— ‘A Theory of Language’, in I. Block, (ed.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of 
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